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1 Introduction
We describe a context more primitive than set theory, with a considerably
weaker logic. Inside this context we find relaxed set theory that, among other
things, provides a universal model for the ZFC axioms.
Category theorists should find this approach comfortable: the basic ingredi-
ents of the primitive context are essentially the object and morphism primitives
of category theory. Others should find it almost as easy to use as naive set the-
ory, even with full precision. The axioms are much less complex than ZFC. In
partcular they do not involve first-order logic, which justifies the general math-
ematical practice of ignoring first-order fine print in ZFC. Finally—modulo the
Quantification hypothesis—it is well-defined. This justifies the general practice
of ignoring the many strikingly different implementations of ZFC.
The approach may also offer some perspective for set theorists. Starting in
a more general context makes it possible to pin down exactly why the ordinal
numbers (class of all sets, universe of elements, etc.) is not a set: it does not
support quantification. This means the set theory does not satisfy the axioms
of Kelly-Morse or von Neumann-Go¨del-Bernys, and is not a Grothendieck Uni-
verse. There may be subtheories that do satisfy these axioms, though, and these
conclusions depend on the Quantification axiom.
The universal model might provide a way to organize the profound work
on ZFC models done in the last century. It may also have consequences for
the theory of large cardinals. For example it is known ([Jech] §17) that if a
model has a measurable cardinal then it has a nontrivial elementary extension.
The universal model has no nontrivial extensions, so evidently it cannot have a
measurable cardinal.
1.1 Some ideas
The key to this development is explicit use of logical functions: functions to
{yes, no}. In the traditional approach these are usually implicit, and rely on the
“Law of Excluded Middle”. To illustrate this, suppose we have a collection of
objects, A, and a sub-collection B ⊂ A. Given a ∈ A we might ask: “is a in
B?” Excluded-middle asserts that this question always has an answer, either
‘yes’ or ‘no’. In other words, there is a logical function on A that detects B.
As a result the traditional focus is on subcollections, and functions that detect
them are implicit. In the general context here there are subcollections that are
not logical, so more precision is required.
Other features missing in the primitive theory but necessary for mainstream
mathematics are: a meaning for equality of elements in a collection; and quan-
tification. Accordingly, we identify the subcontext in which these are available.
A logical domain is a collection with a pairing A × A → yes/no that returns
‘yes’ if and only if the two inputs are the same (in a sense to be made precise
later). These are settings for basic binary logic. Quantification also concerns
identifications, but up a level. The powerset of a logical domain, denoted P[A],
is the collection of all logical functions on A. We say that a logical domain
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supports quantification if there is a logical function P[A]→ yes/no that detects
the empty (always ‘no’) function. The reason is that standard expression for
this uses quantification: (h = ∅) := (∀x ∈ A, h[x] = no). Conversely, if this
one quantification expression is implemented, other quantification expressions
over A also work. ‘Supports quantification’ is equivalent to ‘P[A] is a logical
domain’.
In principle this pattern could continue: suppose P[A] is a logical domain,
and ask “is P2[A] a logical domain?”. The Quantification hypothesis, assumed
here, asserts that this is always true. This hypothesis is the least well established
of the axioms, and its negation also seems tenable. Fortunately this uncertainty
effects things only at the very largest scales, and only set- and category-theorists
are likely to be interested. There is further discussion in §2.4.
Returning to the discussion, it turns out that logical domains that support
quantification have all the properties desired of sets, though it takes some de-
velopment (well-orders, cardinals, etc.) to see this. Accordingly we call them
‘sets’, or ‘relaxed sets’ if distinctions are necessary. Note that these sets are
free-range in the sense that they are identified individually rather than caged
in a model for an elaborate axiom system. As a result they are much easier to
use with full precision.
1.2 Outline
Section 2 describes the primitives of descriptor theory (undefined objects, core
logic, and assumed hypotheses). Primitive objects are essentially the ‘object’
and ‘morphism’ primitives of category theory. These emerged from a great deal
of trial and error, with set theory as the goal: their suitability for categories
is a bonus rather than a design objective. The primitive logic is weaker than
standard binary logic, and in particular does not include the “law of excluded
middle”. Most of it uses assertions rather than binary (yes/no) logic. The prim-
itive hypotheses are mostly standard, including the axiom of Choice. To this we
add the Quantification hypothesis mentioned above. The success of traditional
set theory provides good experimental evidence that, except for Quantification,
these are consistent. We hope to explore consequences of Quantification being
false in a subsequent paper. In a nutshell, the development is considerably more
complicated and the outcome seems less elegant.
Section 3 describes logical functions, logical domains, and quantification. It
also includes a discussion of logical pairings (functions A×B → yes/no).
Section 4 gives a brief description of “relaxed” set theory. We describe the
differences from usual set theory, and give some indications how it provides a
good context for category theory and mainstream mathematics.
The development of well-orders is recalled in Section 5. The first real novelty
appears when we considerW, the domain with elements the isomorphism classes
of well-orders. The Burali-Forti paradox, formulated in the late 1800s, shows
that W cannot be well-ordered. It comes close: it is a logical domain with a
linear order such that every bounded subdomain is well-ordered. The resolution
of the paradox is that W does not support quantification. Therefore, we cannot
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logically distinguish between functions on it. We can, for instance, show that a
subdomain that is known to be cofinal, is order-isomorphic to W, but there is
no logical function that distinguishes cofinal subdomains from bounded ones.
Section 6 recalls the development of cardinals and cardinality. The outcome
is essentially the same as in classical set theory, though some of the arguments
are slightly different. There is an “almost-cardinal” upper bound for the cardi-
nals, namely the order-isomorphism type of W. Cardinals are used to construct
the universal ZFC theory.
Section 7 gives the construction of the universal ZFC set theory. This is a
von Neumann-type cumulative hierarchy, and uses Cantor’s Beth function (§6.3)
as a template. The result is a set theory that satisfies all the Zermillo-Fraenkel-
Choice axioms and, as mentioned above, is the universal such theory.
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2 Primitives
There are three types of irreducible ingredients: primitive objects, primitive
logic, and primitive hypotheses. We particularly focus on the logic since it is
weaker than the logic embedded in our language.
2.1 Primitive objects
Standard practice in mathematics is to define new things in terms of old, and
use the definition to infer properties from properties of the old things. The
old things are typically defined in terms of yet more basic things. But to get
started there must be some objects that are not defined. Properties and usage
of primitive objects must be specified directly, since they cannot be inferred
from a definition.
The primitive objects here are essentially the “object” and “morphism”
primitives of category theory. This was not a deliberate choice: set theory was
the goal, but a great deal of experimentation led to category theory anyway.
Descriptors
Object descriptors, usually shortened to just “descriptor”, are indicated by
the symbol ∈∈. Useage takes the form x∈∈A, which we read as “x is an output
of the descriptor ∈∈A”, or “x is an object in A”.
The term “descriptor” is supposed to suggest that these describe things but,
unlike the “element of” primitive in set theory, they have no logical ability to
identify outputs. In more detail, if x is already specified then in standard set
theory the expression “x ∈ A” may be expected (by excluded middle) to be
‘true’ or ‘false’. Here, for previously specified x, x∈∈A is usually a usage error
that invalidates arguments. However, see the assertion forms below in §2.2.
Syntax for defining descriptors takes the form “x∈∈A means ‘. . . ’ ”. For
example, the descriptor whose objects are themselves descriptors is defined by:
A∈∈DS means “A is a descriptor.” A more standard example is the descriptor
for groups. “G is a group”, or G∈∈(groups) means “G is a set together with a
binary operation that is associative, and has a unit and inverses”.
Morphisms
Morphisms of descriptors are essentially the primitives behind functors of cat-
egories. “f : ∈∈A → ∈∈B is a morphism” means that every object x∈∈A
specifies an object f [x]∈∈B.
“Specifies” can be made somewhat more precise, but it seems to work well
enough in practice that we forego the complication. The logical-function overlay
also imposes more discipline. Morphisms have some of the structure expected of
functors: for instance morphisms A
f // B and B
g // C can be composed
to get a morphism
A
g◦f // C .
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This composition is associative, for the usual reason, but stating this requires
use of the assertion form of = (see ‘Primitive logic’, below).
The definition of ‘morphism’ is implicitly a descriptor. More explicitly, given
descriptors ∈∈A,∈∈B, the morphism descriptor is defined by: f∈∈morph[A,B]
means “f is a morphism A→ B”.
2.2 Primitive logic
Logic provides methods of reasoning with primitive objects and hypotheses. The
core logic here is weaker than that of set theory. We describe primitive logical
terms, and provide examples to illustrate useage.
In traditional set theory, logic is presented as a formal language, cf. [Manin].
The role of first-order predicate calculus in some of the axioms seems to make
this formality necessary. The lack of an analogous restriction here enables us to
be less formal, but deeper investigations may require more precision.
Assertions
An assertion is a statement that is known to be correct, usually in the sense
that it follows from definitions and primitive hypotheses.
Assertions are generally indicated by an exclamation mark. We think of
statements in traditional binary logic as questions, with value either ‘yes’ or
‘no’. Accordingly, these are often indicated by a question mark. The following
are the main assertion statements:
1. “a != b” is read as “ a is known to be identical to b” (see below for “iden-
tical”);
2. “!∃ a | . . .” is read as “it is known that there exist an element a such that
(. . . ) ”.
3. “!6 ∃ a | . . .” is read as “it is known that there does not exist an element a
such that (. . . ) ”.
4. “!∀a | . . .” is read as “it is known that for all a, (. . . ) holds”.
5. “a !∈∈A” is read as “it is known that a is an output of the descriptor
∈∈A”.
The main functional difference from binary logic is that these cannot be usefully
negated. For instance, the negation of “a is known to be identical to b” is
“a is not known to be identical to b”. This has no logical force. Proofs by
contradiction still work, in the sense that if is known that if “x has Q” is false,
then x is known not to have Q.
We also use the common notation := for “defined by”. Note (:=)⇒ ( != ).
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More about ‘ != ’
Officially, “identical” in the definition of a != b means that a, b are symbols
representing a single output of the descriptor.
Example: Suppose ∈∈A and ∈∈B are descriptors, and b0∈∈B. Then there are
projections and inclusions
p : A×B → A, by (a, b) 7→ a
j : A→ A×B, by a 7→ (a, b0)
Then p[j[a]] != p[(a, b0)] != a.
Sometimes there are more-explicit formulations for identity. For example,
suppose f, g : ∈∈A → ∈∈B are morphisms of descriptors. Then (f != g) is
equivalent to (!∀a∈∈A, f [a] != g[a]). This formulation of “identical” makes the
usual proof of associativity of composition work. Explicity, suppose
A1
f1 // A2
f2 // A3
f3 // A4
are morphisms of descriptors. Then f3 ◦ (f2 ◦ f1) != (f3 ◦ f2) ◦ f1.
Example: Russell’s paradox
This gives an assertion that cannot be a logical function.
Suppose ∈∈A is a descriptor, and consider the statement (∈∈A)∈∈A. This
makes sense as an assertion, ie. “consider A such that A is known to be an object
of itself”. Suppose it is implemented by a logical function defined on descriptors.
In that case we could define a descriptor ∈∈NotIn by: A∈∈NotIn means “the
logical function #∈∈# has value ‘no’ on A”. This leads to a contradiction
because the value of NotIn∈∈NotIn cannot be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Therefore
there is no such logical function.
Here is another way to look at this. Descriptors cannot recognize their
outputs, so any interpretation of (∈∈A)∈∈A other than an assertion (eg. as a
defining characteristic) is a useage error. In contrast, the logic of traditional set
theory implies A ∈ A must define a logical function on sets. The traditional
conclusion from the contradiction is that the descriptor NotIn cannot be a set.
Alternatively, ZFC theories are well-founded so A ∈ A always has value ‘no’.
Negating gives that if NotIn is a set then NotIn∈∈NotIn must be ‘yes’. Since
this is not possible, NotIn cannot be a set.
Example: von Neumann’s axiom
von Neumann’s “axiom of size” for this context would assert that a domain A is
a set if and only if the classW (the ordinals) does not inject into it. The binary-
logic interpretation is that this would give a criterion for something to be a set.
This would considerably simplify set theory because it implies many of the ZFC
axioms. The axiom did not catch on because the experts of the time (eventually
including von Neumann) worried that it is too powerful. These experts were
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right if the Quantification hypothesis is right: we see that the axiom is true in
an assertion sense, but does not give a yes/no criterion for domains to be sets.
This illustrates some of the subleties of assertion statements. (If Quantification
is wrong then von Neumann’s axiom does work; we explain this in a subsequent
paper.)
Proposition. Suppose A is a logical domain.
1. There is known to be an injection W → A if and only if A is known not
to be a set; and conversely
2. It is known there is no such injection if and only if A is known to be a set.
However there is no logical function that detects which of (1) or (2) hold.
See §5.4. So knowledge, about whether or notW injects, translates faithfully
to knowledge about whether or not something is a set. Unfortunately this
knowledge is not encoded in a logical function, so cannot be used to detect sets.
For the same reason, item (2) cannot be obtained by negating (1).
Example: Subdescriptors and the set-builder notation
The traditional set-builder notation is useful in describing general subdescrip-
tors, but not logical ones.
First, define a subdescriptor to be an injective morphism of descriptors. A
subdescriptor is logical if there is a logical function that detects its image. We
make this last explicit. Suppose b : ∈∈B → ∈∈A is an injective morphism. and
p : A→ y/n. Then p detects B if (y∈∈A& p[y] = yes)⇐⇒ (!∃x∈∈B | b[x] != y).
Now suppose ∈∈X is an object descriptor, and some of the y∈∈A have a
property denoted ‘P ’ (“property” is a placeholder for some sort of assertion; see
example below). The traditional set-builder notation is
{y∈∈A | y has P}.
We interpret this as a subdescriptor. The official syntax is:
z∈∈{y∈∈A | y has P} means “z∈∈A& (z has P )”.
In this form we see that y is a dummy variable, and it may be a bit clearer if we
write it explicitly that way: {#∈∈A | # has P}. Finally, “has P” should be un-
derstood as an assertion, and might be better written as “# is known to have P”.
Example: if f : ∈∈B → ∈∈A is a morphism of descriptors, then the image of f
is
im[f ] := {#∈∈A |!∃x∈∈B | # != f [x]}.
We caution that, in contrast to traditional set theory, the set-builder notation
does not define a logical function. Traditionally one could begin with z∈∈A,
and expect z∈∈{#∈∈A | # has P} to return ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (or, ‘true’ or ‘false’)
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depending on whether or not z has P . Here, however, “has P” may not be a
logical function and, if the expression can be considered to have a value, it is
‘wrong’. This shows up in the logic as follows: descriptors cannot identify their
outputs, so choosing z∈∈A first makes writing z∈∈{#∈∈A | # has P} a syntax
error.
We usually use the same name to denote a logical function and the corre-
sponding logical subdescriptor. Thus, if p : A → y/n is a logical function, we
define x∈∈p := (x∈∈A& p[x] = yes). The right-hand side of this is essentially
the traditional notation when “x has P” means “p[x] = yes”, but it retains the
information that “has P” is a logical function.
2.3 Primitive hypotheses
Primitive hypotheses are assertions that we believe are consistent, but cannot
justify by reasoning with other primitives. Instead we regard these as experi-
mental hypotheses. More than a century of extremely heavy use indicates that
most of them are completely reliable. The Quantification hypothesis is less
well-tested; see below.
Hypotheses
Two : There is a descriptor ∈∈y/n such that yes∈∈y/n, no∈∈y/n and if a∈∈y/n
then either a != yes or a != no.
Choice : Suppose f : ∈∈A → ∈∈B is a morphism of object descriptors and
f is known to be onto. Then there is a morphism g : ∈∈B → ∈∈A so
that g ◦ f is (known to be) the identity. We refer to such morphisms as
sections.
Infinity : The powerset of the natural numbers is a logical domain. (Equiv-
alently, the real numbers is a logical domain, or, the natural numbers
support quantification.)
Quantification : If A and P[A] are logical domains, then so is P2[A]. Equiva-
lently, if A supports quantification then P[A] does too.
2.4 Discussion
About Two
The force of this hypothesis is that, unlike general descriptors, we can tell the
objects apart. This is an excluded-middle conclusion that needs to be made
explicit because we do not require the general principle.
The names ‘yes’, ‘no’ are chosen to make it easy to remember operations
(‘and’, ‘or’, etc.). One might prefer ‘1’ and ‘0’ for indexing or connections to
Boolean algebra. We avoid ‘true’ and ‘false’ because other uses conflict with
this.
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About Choice
The term “choice” comes from the idea that if a morphism is onto, then we
can “choose” an element in each preimage to get a morphism g. Note that in
general there is no logical-function way to determine if a morphism is onto, or
if the composition is the identity. These must be assertions, as above.
The axiom of choice in the traditional setting has strong consequences that
have been extensively tested for more than a century. No contradictions have
been found, and it is now generally accepted. The above form extends the
well-established version to contexts without quantification. This extension has
implicitly been used in category theory, again without difficulty.
About Infinity
Using primitive objects and hypotheses other than Infinity, we can construct
the natural numbers N as a logical domain. However we cannot show that it
supports quantification, or equivalently, that the definition of the real numbers
using P[N] is a logical domain. The Infinity hypothesis is that this is the case.
This is essentially the same as the ZFC axiom “there is an infinite set”.
About Quantification
Without the axiom one sees that there is a threshold n so that if Pn[A] is a
domain then Pk[A] is a domain for all k. Huristically, if Pn does not make
A explode, then it never explodes. The quantification hypothesis is that the
threshold is 1: if it is going to explode then it does so immediately. Counterex-
amples could only occur at very large scale, larger than any set, so are irrelevant
for most practical purposes.
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3 Logical domains, and quantification
We provide formal definitions and basic properties of logical domains and quan-
tification. Only first-order quantification is used until the final subsection.
3.1 Logical domains
A descriptor ∈∈A is a logical domain, or simply “domain”, if there is a logical
function of two variables that detects equality. Explicitly, there is ?= : A × A
such that (a ?= b)⇒ (a != b). We reserve the notation ‘ ?= ’ for this use, i.e. for
equality-detecting pairings on domains.
Logical domain are first-order approximations to traditional sets, so we use
traditional terms. Objects in a domain are referred to as elements, and we use
a ∈ D instead of a∈∈D.
Domains of equivalence classes
A pre-domain consists of (∈∈D, eqv) where
1. ∈∈D is an object descriptor,
2. eqv[x, y] is a logical pairing D ×D → y/n;
3. eqv satisfies the standard requirements for an equivalence relation:
reflexive: eqv[x, x] = yes;
symmetric: eqv[x, y] =⇒ eqv[y, x];
and transitive: eqv[x, y]&eqv[y, z] =⇒ eqv[x, z].
Given this data we define a quotient descriptor by: h∈∈D/eqv means “h
is a logical function D → y/n and h != eqv[x,#] for some x∈∈D”. Define
?= : D/eqv×D/eqv→ y/n by: suppose h != eqv[x,#] and g != eqv[y,#], then
(h ?= g) := eqv[x, y]. The hypothesis that ‘eqv’ is a (logical) equivalence relation
implies that ‘ ?= ’ is a logical pairing, and does not depend on which represen-
tatives x, y are used. Similarly ?= =⇒ != . Thus (D/eqv, ?= ) is a logical
domain.
Finally, note that if ?= =⇒ != , as in the definition of domain, then ?= is
automatically an equivalence relation. Therefore domains are also pre-domains;
exactly those for which the quotient function D → D/eqv is a bijection.
3.2 Cantor-Bernstein theorem
This is the first of a number of classical results that we review to clarify quan-
tification and binary-logic requirements. It is put here to emphasize it does not
require quantification.
Theorem. (Cantor-Bernstein) Suppose A,B are logical domains and A →
B → A are injections with logical image. Then there is a bijection A ' B.
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Proof: Composing the injections reduces the hypotheses to the following.
Suppose J : A→ A is an injection, j : A→ y/n detects the image of J , and k is
a logical function with j ⊂ k ⊂ A (k detects B). Composing with iterates of J
gives a sequence
· · · k ◦ Jn+1 ⊂ j ◦ Jn ⊂ k ◦ Jn · · · ⊂ j ◦ J0 ⊂ k ◦ J0 ⊂ A.
Define a new function Jˆ : A→ A by:
Jˆ [a] :=
{
if ?∃n ∈ N | a ∈ k ◦ Jn − j ◦ Jn, then a
if not then J [a]
Then it is straightforward to see that Jˆ is a bijection A→ k ' B, as required.
The first case in the definition of Jˆ uses quantification over the natural
numbers, but the Axiom of Infinity asserts that this is valid. In the second case
“if not” makes sense because we can apply not[∗] to a logical function.
3.3 Quantification
The empty function on A is ∅[a] := no, for all a ∈ A.
Definition. A logical domain (A, ?= ) supports quantification, or is a set
if there is a logical function P[A]→ y/n that detects the empty function.
The traditional quantification notation for the empty-set detecting function
is (∀a ∈ A, h[a] ?= no). The logic here does not imply that such expressions
define logical functions. However if there is a logical function that implements
the intent of this particular expression, then all expressions using quantification
over A will define logical functions. This is illustrated by:
Lemma. A domain supports quantification if and only if P[A] is a domain.
Suppose ?= is a logical pairing on P[A] such that ?= ⇒ != . Then
# ?= ∅ is a logical function that detects the empty function. Conversely, sup-
pose φ : P[A] → y/n detects ∅, ie (φ[h] = yes) ⇔ (h != ∅). Define ‘ ?= ’ by
(h ?= g) := φ[# 7→ (h[#] = g[#])]. Then
(h ?= g) =⇒ (!∀# ∈ A, h[#] = g[#]) =⇒ (h != g).
Operations on P[A]
The logical operations on y/n induce operations on logical functions A → y/n,
and these correspond to traditional operations on subsets. Explicitly:
1. intersection: h1 ∩ h2 := h1&h2
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2. union: h1 ∪ h2 := h1 orh2
3. complement: D − h1 := not[h1]
We caution that these operations may not be defined for subdomains that are
not logical; see the next section.
3.4 Subdomains
Logical functions correspond to subsets in traditional set theory: the function
h : A → y/n determines a subset by {x ∈ A | h[x] = yes}. In the traditional
theory “excluded middle” is assumed to hold, which implies that the function
can be recovered from the subset. Here, failure of excluded middle means there
may be subdomains that are not logical; see ‘Example: subdescriptors’ in 2.2
for explanation and notation. However we have:
Lemma. Suppose B ⊂ A is a subdomain. If B is a set then it is logical.
Conversely, if A is a set and B is logical, then B is a set.
We will eventually see that subdomains of a set domains must be logical, so
“logical” can be dropped from the converse statement.
Proof: The traditional expression for a logical function that detects B is
b[x] := (x ∈ A& ?∃ y ∈ B | y ?=x). If B is a set then it supports quantification
and ‘?∃ ’ defines a logical function. For the converse suppose b[#] detects B. A
logical function h on B extends to one on A by hˆ[x] := (b[x]&h[x]), and the
extension is empty if and only if h is empty. But since A is a set we can logically
detect the empty function on it. Applying this to hˆ detects the empty function
on B.
Functions with set support
There is a useful blend of the above two lemmas. Suppose A is a logical domain,
and define sP[A] to be the logical functions whose support is (known to be) a
set.
Lemma. sP[A] is a logical domain, for any A.
Proof: Suppose B,C ⊂ A are sets. Then (B ⊆ C) := (?∀b ∈ B | C[b] = yes)
is a logical pairing (because B is a set) that detects inclusion. Define B ?=C
by (B ⊆ C)& (C ⊆ B), then ?= =⇒ != , as required.
3.5 Logical pairings
A logical pairing is a logical function of two variables, or equivalently, a func-
tion on a product λ : A×B → y/n.
This section briefly mentions basic structure, and describes detection of spe-
cial pairings. In traditional set theory, topology, etc. logical pairings are usually
called ‘relations’, but this term is not used here.
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Examples
Equivalence relations, isomorphisms, orderings, and set theories are all defined
in terms of pairings. The ‘ ?= ’ and ‘eqv’ functions required in the definition of
domain and pre-domain are pairings.
Functions f : A→ B are primitive objects here. On domains, functions de-
termine pairings by fˆ [a, b] := (f [a] ?= b), and this puts them in a larger context
where they can be logically manipulated.
If A is a set then P[A] is a domain and the evaluation pairing
Ev : P[A]×A→ y/n,
is defined by Ev[h, x] := h[x]. Note the convention that the P[A] variable comes
first in the evaluation pairing. This order seems to be the most convenient, but
it is not consistent with some traditional notations. For instance if we think of
h as a subset then h[x] is traditionally denoted by ‘x ∈ h’, with the A variable
first.
Standard structure
Suppose λ : A×B → y/n is a pairing of sets. Then:
1. the domain of λ is the logical function on A defined by: dom[λ, a] :=
(?∃ b∈B | λ[a, b]). The image is defined similarly.
2. The opposite is defined by formally changing the order of the variables:
λop[b, a] := λ[a, b]. Note that the domain of λop is the image of λ, and vice
versa.
3. λ is single-valued if ∀a, x, y, (λ[a, x]&λ[a, y]) =⇒ (x = y)
4. λ is injective if the opposite is single-valued;
Note that ‘single-valued’ does not require that the domain of λ be all of A. If
dom[λ] = A then we say λ has full domain. Pairings corresponding to functions
are automatically full-domain. The opposite notion, full-image, is traditionally
called “onto”.
Adjoints
Suppose λ is a pairing on A×B and B is a set. Then P[B] is a logical domain,
and we can define the adjoint function λadj : A→ P[B] by:
a 7→ λ[a,#].
For example, the evaluation pairing Ev : P[B] × B has adjoint the identity
function P[B]→ P[B].
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Composition
Suppose α : A × B → y/n and β : B × C → y/n are pairings of sets. The
composition is defined by
(α ∗ β)[a, c] := (?∃ b∈B | α[a, b]&β[b, c]).
If α, β are both single-valued then pairing-composition corresponds to com-
position of the associated functions, but the notations have reversed order. If
we denote the function associated to a single-valued λ by λ̂ : A→ B then
α̂ ∗ β = β̂ ◦ α̂.
3.6 Detection of special pairings
We will sometimes want questions such as “is there a nice pairing on A × B?”
to define a logical function of A and B. This proceeds in two steps. First, show
we can detect nice pairings with a logical function P[A×B]→ y/n. This usually
requires quantification on A×B. The second step is “is the detecting function
nonempty?”, which requires quantification on P[A×B]. We an example.
Suppose A,B are sets.
1. There is a logical function ?inj : P[A×B]→ y/n such that λ is an injection
if and only if ?inj[λ] = yes;
2. “is there an injective pairing on A×B?” is therefore a logical function of
A,B.
The required function is:
?inj[λ] := (?∀a1, a2 ∈ A, b ∈ B, (λ[a1, b]&λ[a2, b] =⇒ a1 = a2))
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4 Disjointness and categories
Relaxed sets have all the properties usually expected of sets, though it takes the
technical developments of the next two sections to show this. Here we explain
one of the differences: generic disjointness. The category material describes
modifications needed in the standard definitions c.f. [Mac Lane], and discusses
skeleta and small categories.
4.1 Generic disjointness
Two logical domains can intersect only if they are both subdomains of another
domain. In traditional set theory, sets are all subdomains of the class of all
possible elements. In principle, therefore, two randomly-chosen sets could in-
tersect. If disjointness is needed then, again in principle, repositioning may be
necessary.
In actual practice most mathematicians assume sets are disjoint unless there
is a reason they might intersect. Relaxed set theory justifies this assumption.
A logical domain is an object descriptor. Generally there is no logical function
that can determine whether the output of one descriptor is somehow the same
as, or equivalent to, the output of another. Domains are therefore generally
disjoint, not because equality of elements is defined and the domains are known
not to share elements, but because equality of elements is not defined.
4.2 Categories
Categories, functors, etc. have very general definitions here. The ones of most
use are essentially the same as in [Mac Lane], with relaxed sets substituted for
the Foundations section of that work, §1.6.
Definition, category
A category A consists of:
1. an object descriptor, denoted by obj[A] or objA;
2. for every pair A,B∈∈A, an object descriptor morphA[A,B] ;
3. for every triple A,B,C∈∈A, a “composition” morphism
∗ : morph[A,B]×morph[B,C]→ morph[A,C]
such that
4. composition is associative, and there are identity elements id[A] in morph[A,A],
for every A.
Note that we are using “∗” for composition because the order is opposite the tra-
ditional one. If A
f // B and B
g // C then we can write the composition
as either f ∗ g or g ◦ f .
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We say that a category is ordinary if the morphism-descriptors are (relaxed)
sets. Traditional treatments are restricted to ordinary categories
Functors and natural transformations in this context are straightforward
translations of the traditional notions, [Mac Lane] §1.3, 1.4.
Example: object descriptors
The properties ascribed, in §2.1, to the primitive notions “object descriptor”
and “morphism” are essentially that they form a category. To make this ex-
plicit, define X∈∈OD to mean “X is an object descriptor”. F∈∈morphOD[X,Y ]
means “F is a morphism of object descriptors.” Composition is composition of
morphisms.
Some care is needed in using this category due to the failure of quantification.
For example, we might be able to show two morphisms are the same, or are
different, but generally there are no logical functions that distinguish between
morphisms.
Example: sets
The standard category of sets, denoted Set, has objects relaxed sets, and mor-
phisms the functions A → B. We enlarge this a bit. The category of sets and
pairings has objects sets, and morph[A,B] := P[A × B]. Composition of mor-
phisms is defined to be the composition of pairings (α, β) 7→ α ∗ β defined in
§3.5.
This definition requires objects to be sets because composition of pairings
requires quantification. (Set, pairings) has (Set, functions) as a subcategory:
functions correspond to single-valued pairings with full domain. It follows that
both of these categories are ordinary (morphism descriptors are sets).
Example: categories and functors
We denote by Cat the category with objects categories, and morphisms the
functors between categories. In the next section we will use skeleta to find
ordinary subcategories of this.
4.3 Isomorphism classes and skeleta
Isomorphism classes of objects in an ordinary category constitute a logical do-
main. Morphisms do not naturally descend to isomorphism classes, but we can
get unnatural ones using the axiom of Choice. The result is called a “skeleton” of
the category. This is a standard construction in category theory, cf. [Mac Lane],
but the set-theory foundations used previously seem not to fully justify the way
it is used.
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Isomorphism classes
Suppose A is a category, and X,Y ∈∈A are objects. An isomorphism is, as
usual, a morphism i ∈ morph[X,Y ] such that there exists a j ∈ morph[Y,X] so
that the compositions i ∗ j and j ∗ i are identities. If i is an isomorphism then,
again as usual, the inverse j is unique, and is also an isomorphism. Composition
of isomorphisms give isomorphisms.
If the morphism-descriptors of A are sets, then ?iso[X,Y ], defined by “is
there an isomorphism X → Y ?” is a logical function of X,Y (see §3.6). This
is an equivalence relation on objects. According to ‘Domains of equivalence
classes’ in §3.1, the equivalence classes form a logical domain. We denote this
by objA/iso. There is a quotient morphism (of object descriptors) q : objA →
objA/iso.
Since functors preserve identity morphisms, they also preserve isomorphisms.
A functor F : A → B therefore induces a function F : objA/iso → objB/iso.
In other words #/iso is a functor, from ordinary categories and functors, to
domains and functions.
Skeleta
A category S is skeletal if the objects objS constitute a logical domain (ie. we
can distinguish between them), and isomorphic objects are equal. The iso-
morphism condition is equivalent to: the quotient function, from objects to
isomorphism classes, is a bijection.
A skeleton of a category A is a skeletal category and a functor s : S → A
that induces a bijection on isomorphism classes, and is a bijection on morphism
sets.
Proposition. (Existence of skeleta)
1. Every ordinary category has a skeleton;
2. the inclusion of a skeleton is an equivalence of categories.
The proof is routine, but we go through it because this is where the strong
form of ‘Choice’ is used.
For the first step note that the quotient q : obj(A)→ obj(A)/iso is known to
be a surjective morphism of descriptors. Choice therefore asserts that there is a
section, h. Define a category S with objects the equivalence classes obj(A)/iso
and morphisms morphS [x, y] := morphA[h[x], h[y]]. It should be clear that S
is skeletal. We get a functor h : S → A by the section h on objects, and the
identity on morphisms.
The next step is to extend the quotient function q : obj(A) → obj(A)/iso =
obj(S) to a functor. To begin, consider the descriptor with objects (a, θ), where a
is an object in (A) and θ is an isomorphism a ' h[q[a]]. The forgetful morphism
from this to obj(A) is onto, so again we can chose a section. Denote this by
a 7→ (a, θ1[a]). We tidy this up a bit. Define θ2 by
a
θ[a] // h[a]
θ[h[a]]−1// h[a].
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Then θ2 has the benefit that it takes an image object h[b] to (h[b], id). Note
that we cannot get θ2 by saying “for objects in the image of h, define θ2[h[a]] :=
(h[a], id) and extend randomly to other objects”. For this to be valid we would
need a logical function on obj(A) that detects the image of h, and there is
generally no reason such a function should exist.
Now extend q to morphisms by: for f : a→ b, q[f ] is the composition
h[q[a]]
θ2[a]
−1
// a
f // b
θ2[b] // h[q[b]]
Recall that this is a morphism in S because h is the identity on morphisms.
The proof is completed by observing that q is a functor; q ◦ h = id[S]; and
θ2 is a natural equivalence h ◦ q ' id[A].
4.4 Small categories
This illustrates the use of skeleta. It is extended to “almost-small” categories
in another paper. An ordinary category A is said to be small if the domain of
isomorphism classes objA/iso is a set.
Traditionally “small” requires the collection of all objects, not just isomor-
phism classes, to be a set. Relaxing the condition to isomorphism classes fits
better with the way categories are typically used, particularly as regards expec-
tations about disjointness; see the discussion above.
Proposition. If A,B are small categories then the functor category Funct[A,B]
is small.
Since equivalences of categories induce isomorphisms of functor categories,
the proposition reduces to the case where both A and B are skeleta. In this
case functors are a subdomain of the union, over functions f : objA → objB
of products:
∏
(a,b)∈objAmorphB[f [a], f [b]]. But smallness implies that this is a
set.
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5 Well-orders
We briefly recall the properties of well orders, and show that there is a universal
almost well-ordered domain. Basic properties of this domain are described.
Only first-order quantification is used in this section.
5.1 Definitions
Suppose (A,=) is a logical domain.
1. A linear order is a pairing (#1 ≥ #2): A× A → y/n that is transitive;
ie. any two elements are related: (a ≥ b) or (b ≥ a); and elements related
both ways are the same: (a ≥ b)& (b ≥ a)⇔ (a = b).
2. Suppose (A,≥) is a linear order. A logical subdomain (logical function)
B ⊂ A is said to be saturated if (a ∈ B)& (a ≥ b) =⇒ b ∈ B.
3. (A,≥) is a well-order if it is a linear order, A is a set, and if B is saturated
then either B = A or the complement A−B has a least element.
4. (A,≥) is an almost well-order if subdomains of the form (x > #) are
well-ordered.
Notes
1. “Saturated” corresponds to “transitive” in traditional set theory; see Jech
[Jech], definition 2.9. We prefer to reserve the term “transitive” for pair-
ings.
2. The definition of ‘well-order’ is slightly different from the usual one (cf. Jech
[Jech] definition 2.3), but it is equivalent and slightly better for the de-
velopment here. As usual, well-orders are hereditary in the sense that if
(A,≥) is well-ordered, and B ⊂ A is a logical subdomain, then the in-
duced order on B is a well-order. Similarly for almost well-orders. If B is
nonempty then it has a unique minimal element denoted by min[B].
3. We will see that an almost well-order fails to be a well-order if and only if
the domain is not a set (fails to support quantification), §5.3. It will turn
out that there is only one of these, up to order-isomorphism.
Well-ordered equivalence classes
This is a variation on the description of ‘Domains of equivalence classes’ in §3.1.
We will use this construction in the definition of the universal almost well-order.
A linear pre-order consists of an object descriptor ∈∈A and a logical
pairing geq[#1,#2] defined on pairs of outputs from the object descriptor .
The pairing satisfies:
1. (transitive) geq[a, b]&geq[b, c]⇒ geq[a, c];
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2. (reflexive) geq[a, a]; and
3. (pre-linear) for all a, b∈∈A, either geq[a, b] or geq[b, a] (or both).
Given this structure, define eqv[a, b] := (geq[a, b]&geq[b, a]). The quotient
A/eqv is a logical domain, and geq induces a linear order in the ordinary sense
on elements (ie. on equivalence classes of objects). The additional conditions
used to define well-orders in this context are the same as those on the element
level.
5.2 Recursion
Our formulation is slightly different from the standard one (cf. [Jech], Theorem
2.15) in part because we do not find the standard one to be completely clear.
This version is for well-orders. There is a version for well-founded partial orders
in §7.2.
First we need a notation for restrictions. Suppose f : A → B is a partially-
defined function and D ⊂ A is a set. Then f  D is the restriction to dom[f ]∩D.
Now, suppose (A,≥) is an almost well-order, D is a domain, and R is a
partially-defined function R : pfn[A,D]×A→ y/n. Here ‘pfn’ denotes partially-
defined functions whose domains are sets; according to ‘Functions with set sup-
port’ in §3.4, this is a logical domain and it is reasonable to think about functions
defined on it. We refer to such an R as a recursion condition.
A function f : A→ B is R-recursive if:
1. dom[f ] is saturated; and
2. for every c ∈ dom[f ], f [c] = R[f  (c > #), c].
Note that this is hereditary in the sense that if D ⊂ dom[f ] is saturated then
the restriction f  D is also recursive.
Proposition. (Recursion) If (A,≥), B,R are as above, then there is a unique
maximal R-recursive (partially-defined) function r : A→ B.
“Maximal” refers to domains: r is maximal if there is no recursive function
with larger domain. We describe a criterion for maximality below. Note that
the domain of r may not be a set (ie. may be all of A); the recursion condition
applies to restrictions to subdomains of the form (a > #), and according to the
definition of a ‘almost’ well-order these are all sets.
The proof is essentially the same as the classical one; we sketch it to illustrate
the slightly non-standard definitions. First, if f, g are recursive and have the
same domain, then they are equal. Suppose not and let a be the least element
on which they differ. Minimality of a implies the restrictions to # < a are equal.
but then
f [a] = R[f  (# < a)] = R[g  (# < a)] = g[a]
a contradiction.
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The maximal r has domain the union ∪(dom[f ] | f is R − recursive). If x
is in this union then x ∈ dom[f ] for some recursive f . Define r[x] := f [x].
Uniqueness implies this is well-defined, and is recursive.
A recursive r is maximal if dom[r] = A or, if dom[r] 6= A and a is the least
element not in dom[r], then (r, a) is not in the domain of R.
Order isomorphisms
The first application of recursion is a key result in traditional set theory. It is
extended to well-founded pairings in §7.2.
Proposition. Suppose (A,≥), (B,≥) are almost well-orders. Then there is
a unique maximal order-isomorphism, from a saturated subdomain of A to a
saturated subdoman of B. Maximality is characterized by either full domain or
full image.
This results from the recursion condition R[f, a] := min[B − im[f ]].
5.3 Universal almost well-order
In this section the domain W is defined, and shown to be universal for almost
well-orders. W corresponds to the “ordinal numbers” of classical set theory,
cf. Jech [Jech], §2.
Definition of W
W is the quotient of an equivalence relation on a descriptor preW.
1. the object descriptor is defined by: (A,≥)∈∈preW means “(A,≥) is a
well-ordered set”;
2. geq[(A,≥), (B,≥)] := (im[r] ?=B), where r : A→ B denotes the maximal
order-isomorphism of saturated subdomains described just above.
We expand on (2). Since A is a set, the image im[r] is a logical function on
B. Since B is a set the comparison of logical functions im[r] ?=B is a logical
function. Finally, since r is uniquely determined by A,B and their well-orders,
im[r] ?=A is a logical function of A,B.
(preW, geq) is a linear pre-order, as defined above. (W,≥) denotes the quo-
tient domain with its induced linear order. The elements of the domain W are
order-isomorphism classes, and we denote the class represented by (A,≥) by
〈A,≥ 〉 (angle brackets).
Canonical embeddings
Recall that if (A,≥) is almost well-ordered and x ∈ A then (x > #) ⊂ A,
with the induced order, is well-ordered. It therefore determines an equivalence
class 〈(x > #),≥ 〉 ∈W. This defines the canonical embedding ω : A→W.
Explicitly, ω[x] = 〈(x > #),≥ 〉.
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Theorem. (Ordinals)
1. (W,≥) is almost well-ordered, but not well-ordered because it does not
support quantification;
2. If (A,≥) is almost well-ordered then the canonical embedding ω : A → W
defined above is an order-isomorphism to a saturated subdomain, and ω is
uniquely determined by this property;
3. If A is a set then the image of ω is (# < 〈A,≥ 〉); if A is not a set (does
not support quantification) then the image is all of W.
Proof of the theorem
First, the properties of maximal order-isomorpisms described in §5.2 imply that
(W,≥) is a linear pre-order. We next see that it is almost well-ordered. If a ∈W
then a is an equivalence class of well-ordered domains 〈A,≥ 〉. As explained in
“canonical embeddings”, there is an order-preserving bijection, from (A,≥) to
the subdomain
(〈A,≥ 〉 > #) ⊂W.
Since A is well-ordered, so is the indicated subdomain of W. But this is the
definition of “almost” well-order.
This proves all but the second halves of (1) and (3) are verified. We take
these up next.
Quantification fails in W
To begin, we make explicit that quantification is the issue.
First, an almost well-order is a well-order if and only if the domain supports
quantification (is a set). One direction is clear: a well-order is a set by definition.
For the converse suppose (A,≥) is an almost well-order on a set, and suppose
h is a saturated logical function on A. Since A is a set, not[h] ?= ∅ is a logical
function that returns either yes, in which case h = A, or no, in which case
∃x | h[x] = no. Saturation implies that h[y] = no for y ≥ x, so h has domain
contained in x > #. But x > # is well-ordered, so either h ?= (x > #) or there
is x > z so that h ?= (z > #). In either case h has the form required to show A
is well-ordered.
Next we use a form of the Burali-Forti paradox to show that (W,≥) cannot
be a well-order. If it were, then by definition of W there would be x ∈ W and
an isomorphism ω : W ' (x > #). But then, ω2 gives an isomorphism with
(ω[x] > #). Since ω[x] < x, this contradicts the fact that isomorphism classes
of well-orders correspond uniquely to elements of W. Thus (W,≥) cannot be a
well-order, and therefore does not support quantification.
The final part of the theorem is to see that if A is an almost well-order and
not a set then the canonical embedding is an isomorphism to W. Suppose there
is x not in the image. The image is saturated, so must be contained in (# < x).
But this is well-ordered, so a saturated subdomain of it must be a set. This
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contradicts the hypothesis that A is not a set. We conclude that there cannot be
any such x, and therefore ω is onto. It follows that it is an order-isomorphism.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
5.4 Existence of well-orders
We review a crucial classical theorem, and get some information about W.
Proposition. Suppose A is a logical domain.
1. If A is a set then it has a well-order.
2. if A is not a set then there is an injection W→ A.
3. There is no logical fuction that detects which of these alternatives holds.
An version of this is used to illustrate assertion logic in ‘von Neumann’s
axiom’ in §2.2.
Proof: Let sP[A] denote the logical functions on A whose supports are sets,
and sP[A]& (# 6= A) the ones whose support is not all of A. Comments on
the logic: if A is a set then sP[A] = P[A] is a logical domain and (because A
supports quantification) # 6= A is a logical function on it. If A is not a set then
P[A] is not a logical domain. The subdescriptor sP[A] is a logical domain, but
we do not need this now. More to the point, (# 6= A) still makes sense as a
logical function because it is always ‘yes’.
Define a choice function for A to be ch : (sP[A]& (# 6= A))→ A, satisfying
h[ch[h]] = no (ie. ch[h] is in the complement of h). The axiom of Choice implies
that any A has a choice function, as follows: Define c : (sP[A]& (# 6= A))×A→
y/n by c[h, a] := not[h[a]]. The projection of (the support of) c to sP[A] is known
to be onto, due to the “not all of A” condition. According to Choice, there is a
section of this, and sections are exactly choice functions.
We now set up for recursion. Fix a choice function and define a condition
R : pfn[W, A] × A → y/n, where ‘pfn[W,#]’ denotes partially-defined functions
with bounded domain, by:
R[f, a] := ch[im[f  (a > #)]]).
In words, f [a] is the chosen element in the complement of the image of the
restriction f  (a > #).
This is clearly a recursive condition. We conclude that partially-defined
functions r : W→ A satisfying:
1. dom[r] ⊂W is saturated;
2. f [a] = R[r  (a > #), a] holds for all a ∈ dom[r].
form a linearly-ordered domain with a maximal element, and r is maximal if
and only if either im[r] = A or dom[r] =W.
If dom[r] =W then r gives an injective function W→ A and A cannot be a
set. If dom[r] 6=W then r gives a bijection from a saturated proper subdomain
of W to A. But a saturated proper subdomain has a well-order, so A must have
one also.
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5.5 Cofinality in W
This clarifies the structure of W “near infinity”. Suppose (A,≥) is almost well-
ordered and A does not have a maximal element. A logical function h : A→ y/n
is said to be cofinal if for every a ∈ A there is b ∈ h such that b ≥ a. See Jech
[Jech] §3.6. Caution: if A is well-ordered then “is h cofinal?” is a logical function
on P[A]. If A is not well-ordered (ie. is W) then this is not a logical function
and “for every” has to be interpreted as an assertion.
Proposition. A logical function h on W is ( known to be) cofinal if and only
if h with the induced order is ( known to be) order-isomorphic to W.
This is essentially the traditional definition of “regular cardinal”. In these
terms the almost-cardinal i is regular.
Proof: we show that h is a set if and only if it is not cofinal. If it is not
cofinal then there is m larger than any element of h. This means h is a logical
function on (m > #). But this is a set and a logical subdomain of a set is a set.
For the converse, define a function p : W→ h by p[a] := min[h[#]& (a > #)].
If b ∈ h then (since h is cofinal) the preimage p−1[b] is bounded and therefore a
set. According to the Surjection proposition at the end of §3.4, this implies W
is known to be a set if and only if h is known to be a set. But W is not a set
so neither is h. The induced order on h is an almost well-order, so by the last
part of the Main Theorem, it is order-isomorphic to W.
Global choice of well-orders
We give the global analog of the proposition above, then apply it to extend the
characterization of W.
Lemma. There is a morphism of object descriptors that assigns to each set a
well-order on it.
Denote by WO the descriptor with objects, well-orders (A,≥), and Set the
descriptor with objects sets. Forgetting the order gives a morphism WO→ Set.
Since every set has a well-order, this morphism is known to be onto. The axiom
of Choice implies this has a section. This section is the morphism required for
the Lemma.
Corollary. Suppose f : A→W is a function with set point inverses and cofinal
image. Then there is a bijection b : W→ A so that f ◦ b is nondecreasing.
The rule a 7→ f−1[a] defines a morphism W → Set. Compose this with
a morphism that provides a well-order on each set. This gives a well-order
(f−1[a],≥a), for every a. Now define an order on A by:
(x ≥ y) := (f [x] > f [y]) or (f [x] = f [y]& (x ≥f [x] y)).
This is easily seen to be an almost well-order, and f is nondecreasing with
respect to this order. Finally, a cofinal subdomain of W is order-isomorphic to
W. By the characterization theorem above, (A,≥) must be order-isomorphic to
W.
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6 Cardinals
Cardinals have been studied for well over a century. We need a few of the most
basic results, transposed into the current setting.
6.1 Definition of cardinals
Cardinal elements and well-orders
Recall that an element of W is an order-isomorphism class of well-orders. Bi-
jection of underlying sets induces an equivalence relation on W; explicitly,
〈A,≥ 〉 ' 〈B,≥ 〉 if there is a bijection A→ B. An element of W is defined to
be a cardinal element if it is the minimum of its equivalence class.
A cardinal well-order is (A,≤) whose equivalence class in W is a cardinal
element.
The point is that a cardinal well-order is a specific well-order, while cardinal
elements are equivalence classes. These are closely connected, but not quite
the same, and it clarifies some discussions to have both terms. Or more to the
point, traditional texts tend not to distinguish them and some discussions are
muddled by this.
Next we define cardinality of sets. If A is a set, define card[A] to be the
minimum of the bijection equivalence class of (A,≥), for any well-order ≥ on
A. Since bijection-equivalence depends only on the underlying set, this is well-
defined.
Injections
Lemma. If A,B are sets then there is an injection A → B if and only if
card[B] ≥ card[A].
Choose well-orders so card[A] is the equivalence class of (A,≥) and similarly
for card[B]. If card[B] ≥ card[A] then, by definition of the ordering in W, there
is an order-preserving injection A→ B. This proves the ‘if’ part of the lemma.
The ‘only if’ direction is proved by contradiction. Suppose there is an in-
jection A → B but card[A] > card[B]. This and the ‘if’ direction implies there
is an injection B → A. If there are injections both ways the Cantor-Bernstein
theorem ([Jech], Theorem 3.2) asserts that there is a bijection A ' B. But
then card[A] = card[B], contradicting the assumed cardinal inequality. Thus
card[A] ≤ card[B]
We note that the Cantor-Bernstein theorem requires knowing that the im-
ages of injections involved are logical. This follows from Lemma 3.4.
Cofinality
Lemma. Cardinal elements are cofinal in W.
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If not then there is a ∈ W larger than any cardinal. But Cantor’s theorem
implies card[(# < a)] < card[P[# < a]]. This gives a cardinal larger than a, a
contradiction.
An immediate consequence is:
Corollary. A subdomain of a set is a set (ie. is logical).
Proof: Suppose A is a set, and suppose X ⊂ A is a non-logical subdomain.
Non-logical implies X is not a set, which in turn implies that there is an injection
W → X. Restricting this gives an injection (b > #) → A, for any b ∈ W.
The image of such an injection is logical because (b > #) is a set. But since
b is arbitrary, we can choose it so that card[b > #] > card[A]. This cardinal
inequality implies there cannot be an injection (b > #)→ A. This contradiction
refutes the assumption that X ⊂ A is non-logical.
6.2 The almost-cardinal ‘Shin’
W does not have a cardinality because it cannot be well-ordered, but it has
many of the properties of a cardinal domain. For convenience we extend the
definition.
Denote W with a maximal element adjoined by W; this is the “completion”
of W. The new maximal element is denoted by ש (the Hebrew character ‘shin’).
If A is a domain then card[A] = ש means: it is known there is a bijection A 'W.
This has to be used with care: card[A] = ש does not mean that A has a genuine
cardinality, and it happens to be ש. This interpretation would give a logical
function that detects W, and this is impossible.
6.3 The Cantor Beth function
Cantor introduced several functions related to cardinals. Only one is needed
here.
Definition
‘Beth’ (i) is the second character in the Hebrew alphabet, and was used by
Cantor to denote a function W → W that might also be called the “iterated
powerset function. i is briefly mentioned in [Jech] §5, p. 55. This, and the
associated rank function, play major roles in the construction of the ZFC set
theory in §7.
Proposition. There is a unique function i : W→W satisfying:
1. if a = 0, i[a] = card[N ];
2. if a > 0 is not a limit, i[a] = card[P[i[a− 1]]]; and
3. if a is a limit, i[a] = sup[i[# < a]].
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‘sup’ in (3) is the ‘supremum’, which is a convenient shorthand for the min-
imum of larger elements: sup[h] := min[# ≥ (∀a | h[a] = yes).
It is straightforward to formulate a recursive condition on partially defined
functions so that conditions (1)–(3) correspond to fully recursive. Existence of
a maximal such function therefore follows from recursion. The image of i is
cofinal in W for the same reason cardinals are, and this implies the maximal
function has domain all of W.
We extend Beth to the almost-cardinal by i[ש] := ש.
Limits and strong limits
Recall that a ∈W is a limit if (a > #) does not have a maximal element. It is
a strong limit if a > b implies a > card[P[b > #]]. The almost-cardinal ש is a
strong limit, and strong limits less than ש are cardinals.
Proposition. 1. b ≤ i[b];
2. a ∈ W is a strong limit if and only if a = i[x] for either x = 0 or x a
limit. and
3. if b is a limit then the image i[b > #] is cofinal in (i[b] > #).
Proof: (1) is standard, and easily proved by considering the least element
that fails.
For (2), suppose a is a strong limit. i is increasing, so a > i−1[#] is
saturated and therefore of the form x > #. Since b /∈ (i−1[a > #]), i[b] ≥ a.
We show b is a limit. If not then (b > #) has a maximal element, b − 1.
a > i[b − 1], so by definition of strong limit a > i[b − 1] > card[P[#, but the
left side is the definition of i[b], so this contradicts the choice of b. We conclude
(b > #) does not have a maximal element, so b is a limit.
Next, i[b > #] is bounded by a, so sup[i[b > #]] is defined, is ≤ a, and
is the definition of i[b]. But the choice of b requires i[b] ≥ a, so i[b] = a, as
required.
For the other direction of ‘if and only if’, suppose b is a limit. We want to
show that a = i[b] := sup[i[b > #]] is a strong limit. Suppose a > x. Then
there is b > y with i[y] ≥ x. Thus card[P[x > #]] ≤ card[P[i[y] > #]] ≥
card[P[x > #]]. Next, since b is a limit, b > y + 1. But the definition of i
gives card[P[# < i[y]]] = i[y + 1]. Since i[y + 1] < sup[i[b > #]] = a, we get
a > card[P[x > #]]. This verifies the definition of strong limit.
The cofinality conclusion follows from the definition of ‘sup’.
A corollary of (3) in the Proposition is that the cofinalities are the same:
cf [i[b]] = cf [b]. Therefore if b < i[b], or b is not regular, then i[b] is not
regular.
Beth rank
Rank plays a central role in the construction of set theory in §7. This rank
follows the i function closely, and is a bit different from the rank function
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defined in [Jech] §6.2: it starts with rank = 0⇔ ‘finite’, rather than rank = 0⇔
‘empty’, and otherwise differs by +1.
The (Beth) rank is the function W→W given by
rank[x] := min[(# | i[#] > x)].
Note that if a is a limit then there are no elements of rank a. The reason is that
i[a] = sup[i[a > #]], so if i[a] > x then there is some a > b with i[b] > x.
These hidden values come into play in ranks of logical functions, defined next.
If h : W→ y/n is a set (ie. has bounded domain) then define
rank[h] := sup[rank[(# | h[#])]].
If h[#] = (# = a), the function that detects a, then the ranks of a and h are
the same. More generally, h[a]⇒ (rank[a] ≤ rank[h]).
If h is cofinal in g then rank[h] = rank[g].
Finally, consider A = (a > #). rank[a > #] = rank[a] unless a = i[b] for
some b, in which case rank[a > #] = b and rank[a] = b+ 1.
6.4 Hessenberg’s theorem
In the classical development this is a key fact about cardinals. Here it is a key
ingredient in showing ‘relaxed sets’ have the properties expected of sets. One of
the consequences is that if A is an infinite set then card[A×A] = card[A]. We go
through the proof to check the use of quantification, and because the traditional
proof is somewhat muddled by the identification of sets and elements.
The canonical order
Suppose (A,≥), is a linear order. The canonical order on A×A is a partially-
symmetrized version of lexicographic order.
First define the maximum function max : A × A → A by (a, b) 7→ max[a, b].
This induces a pre-linear order on A×A, namely
(a2, b2)  (a1, b1) := max[a2, b2] > max[a1, b1].
The canonical order refines this to a linear order as follows: Fix c ∈ A, then the
elements of A × A with max equal to c have the form (c > #, c) or (c, c ≥ #).
Each of these is given the order induced from A, and pairs of the first form
are defined to be smaller than pairs of the second form. The canonical order is
denoted by ≥can.
More explicitly, (a2, b2) ≥can (a1, b1) means:
(max[a2, b2] > max[a1, b1]) or
((max[a2, b2] = max[a1, b1])& ((a2 > a1) or (a2 = a1& b2 > b1)).
The following is straightforward:
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Lemma. If (A,≥) is a well-order then the canonical order (A × A,≥can) is a
well-order. If ≥ is an almost well-order then so is ≥can.
This implies that the classifying function gives an order-preserving bijection
ω : (W×W,≥can)→ (W,≥).
The main result is a century-old theorem of Hessenberg (see [Jech], Th. 3.5.)
Proposition. If c is an infinite cardinal then
1. ω[(0, c)] = c, or equivalently
2. ω[(c > #)× (c > #)] = (c > #)
Version (1) concerns images of elements, while (2) concerns images of satu-
rated subdomains. They are equivalent because
(c > #)× (c > #) = ((0, c) >can (#1,#2)).
The first step is that ω[0, c] ≥ c. Note that (c > #) × (c > #) contains a
copy of (c > #), so card[(c > #) × (c > #)] ≥ card[(c > #)] = c. But ω is a
bijection, so the image has cardinality ≥ c. The image is (ω[0, c] > #), so by
minimality of cardinals we have ω[0, c] ≥ c.
Next we work out the consequences of strict inequality in this last: suppose
ω[0, c] > c. Since ω is order-preserving, this implies there is (0, c) >can (x, y)
with ω[x, y] = c. Denote the maximum of (x, y) by m, then m < c. Since
cardinals are limits, the successor m + 1 is also less than c. Turning to the
subdomain form, this means (m + 1 > #) × (m + 1 > #) contains (x, y) >can
(#1,#2), which is the preimage of (c > #). Thus card[(m+ 1 > #)× (m+ 1 >
#)] ≥ c. Finally, define d := card[m + 1]. This gives a cardinal c > d so that
card[(d > #)× (d > #)] ≥ c.
We proceed by induction on c to show this cannot happen. To begin, suppose
c = card[N], the first infinite cardinal. If ω[0, c] 6= c then we get d with c > d,
as above. But the domain (d > #) is finite, so the product with itself is
finite, and it is false that the cardinality of the product is ≥ card[N]. Therefore
ω[0, card[N]] = card[N].
Now suppose the proposition is false, and let c be the least cardinal for which
ω[0, c] > c. We get c > d as above, with card[(d > #)× (d > #)] ≥ c. But the
induction hypothesis implies that card[(d > #)× (d > #)] = d, and d < c. This
gives a contradiction, so the proposition must be true.
Products and unions
For finite sets, the cardinality corresponds to the number of elements. So,
cardinality of a disjoint union is the sum of the cardinalities, and cardinality of
a product is the product. The preceeding section implies that the situation is
much simpler for infinite sets.
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Proposition. Suppose A,B are sets, and at least one is infinite. Then
1. card[A×B] = max[card[A], card[B]], and
2. if A,B ⊆ D then card[A ∪B] = max[card[A], card[B]].
Proof: suppose card[A] ≥ card[B], so max[card[A], card[B]] = card[A]. Then
card[A] ≤ card[A×B] ≤ card[A×A] = card[A]
The last step being the Proposition above. This gives (1).
For (2), card[A] ≤ card[A ∪B] ≤ card[A×B] = card[A], by (1).
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7 The universal ZFC theory
This section provides an interface between the present theory and traditional
axiomatic set theory. The main result is a theory that satisfies appropriate
versions of the Zermillo-Fraenkel-Choice (ZFC) axioms, and is maximal in the
sense that any other ZFC set theory injects into it.
7.1 Main result
First, a definition.
Bounded and cofinal logical functions
Suppose (A,≤) is almost well-ordered.
The bounded logical functions, or bounded powerset, denoted bP[A],
consists of the h : A → y/n with a ∈ A such that h[#] ⇒ # < a. The cofinal
logical functions, denoted cfP[A] are the h so that if a ∈ A then there is b ≥ a
with h[b] = yes.
If A has a maximal element m then these reduce to standard things: bP[A]
consists of the h ∈ P[A] with h[m] = no, and cfP[A] consists of the h with
h[m] = yes.
If A is a set then these are complementary subsets of P[A], in the sense that
there is a logical function bP : P[A]→ y/n with support the evident subdomain,
and cfP[A] = not[bP]. If A is not a set (ie. A = W) then they are still comple-
mentary in a sense, but are not logical. In this case ‘bounded’ should therefore
be understood as ‘known to be bounded’, and ‘cofinal’ similarly.
We come to the main result. Some of the terms are defined below.
Theorem. 1. (Existence) There is a pairing 3 : W×W→ y/n whose adjoint
gives a bijection 3adj : W→ bP[W], such that
(a) the restriction N→ bP[N] is the canonical order isomorphism; and
(b) if x /∈ N then rank[3adj [x]] = rank[x]− 1.
2. (Axioms) Such pairings satisfy all the ZFC axioms, appropriately inter-
preted.
3. (Universality) Suppose (A, λ) is an almost well-founded pairing (§7.2).
Then there is a unique function giving a morphism of pairings (A, λ) →
(W,3).
Clarifications: the adjoint of ‘3’ takes elements of rank 1 to the cofinal
functions on N. Technically, all functions on N have rank 0, but the bounded
ones are accounted for by condition (1a). In (1b) recall that ranks of elements
cannot be limits, so rank[x]−1 is defined. Finally, the notation ‘3’ is a reminder
that this is the opposite of the standard ‘∈’ pairings.
Two such pairings ‘3’ differ by a bijection W → W that is the identity on
N and preserves the rank function.
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The universality property is a version of Mostowski collapsing ([Jech], §6.15).
It has several striking corollaries: First, since ZFC theories are well-founded,
every ZFC theory whose sets are relaxed sets, canonically embeds into (W,3).
Note that the relaxed sets in a ZFC theory form a sub-ZFC theory, so this
observation applies to a large part (probably all) of any ZFC theory. Second,
the usual uniqueness of universal objects shows that this property characterizes
(W,3) up to (unique) equivalence.
See §7.2 below for details about well-founded pairiings, and morphisms
thereof.
Proof of Existence
We will show that for every a there is a bijection, from elements of rank a + 1
to logical functions of rank a. The rest of the proof is short: According to the
axiom of choice we can make a simultaneous choice of bijections for all a. These
fit together to give a bijection W→ bP[W]. This is the adjoint of a pairing with
the properties with properties (1a) and (1b).
Now we see that there are bijections as claimed. Suppose a ∈W. There is a
bijection from elements of rank a+ 1 to functions of rank a if these collections
have the same cardinality.
The elements of rank a+ 1 are i[a] ≤ # < i[a+ 1]. This is the complement
of # < i[a] in # < i[a+1]. Since i[a+1] = card[P[# < i[a]]], we are removing
a set of smaller cardinality. According to §6.4, this does not change cardinality.
The cardinality of the collection of elements is therefore card[P[# < i[a]]].
There are two cases for functions. Suppose a is not a limit. Then functions of
rank a are the complement of P[# < i[a−1]] in P[# < i[a]]. Again the smaller
subdomain has smaller cardinality, so removing it does not change cardinality.
Cardinality of the functions is therefore card[P[# < i[a]]], same as the elements.
Now suppose a is a limit. The functions on # < i[a] of rank a are the cofinal
ones. These are the complement of the bounded functions: cfP[# < i[a]] =
P[# < i[a]] − bP[# < i[a]]. We want to show that removing the bounded
functions does not change the cardinality. For this it is sufficient to show that the
cardinality of the complement is at least as large as that of the collection being
removed. This is so because there is an injection bP[# < i[a]]→ cfP[# < i[a]]
defined by h 7→ not[h]. The conclusion is that the cardinality of the functions
is card[P[# < i[a]]], again same as the elements.
7.2 Universality
We begin with translations and slight modifications of some standard material
about well-founded pairings, see [Jech], §6. Then well-founded recursion is used
to prove the theorem.
Well-founded pairings
Suppose λ : A×A→ y/n is a logical pairing on a set.
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1. λ is a partial order if it is transitive and λ[a, a] = no for all a. We
typically denote partial orders by a  b.
2. Any pairing has a transitive closure. The closure is a partial order if the
a 6 a condition is satisfied.
3. A subset B ⊂ A is saturated if (x ∈ B&λ[x, y]) ⇒ (y ∈ B), as with
linear orders.
4. λ is well-founded if every saturated B ⊂ A with nonempty complement
has a minimal element in this complement.
5. Define (A, λ) to be almost well-founded if
(a) the transitive closure of λ, denoted by , is a partial order;
(b) the restriction of λ to a subdomain of the form (a  #) is well-
founded.
This definition of well-founded implies that that any nonempty subset, not just
complements of saturated ones, has a minimal element. This stronger statement
is usually taken as the definition, but the version given is more efficient here.
For example, a pairing is well-founded if and only if its transitive closure is.
This is because the pairing and its closure have the same saturated subsets and
the same minimal elements in their complements, and the definition concerns
only these minimal elements.
A function f : (A, λ)→ (B, τ) is a morphism of pairings if τ [f [a], x]⇔ (∃b ∈
A | (f [b] = x)&λ[a, b]). Note that this implies the image of f is τ -saturated in
B.
In general, morphisms of pairings need not be injective. It is straightforward
to see:
1. if the adjoint λadj : A→ P[A] is injective then f is injective; and
2. if τadj : B → P[B] is injective then f is unique.
The injective-adjoint condition is traditionally called “extensional”.
Recursion
Suppose (A,) is an almost well-founded partial order. As in §5.2, a recursion
condition is a partially-defined function R : pfn[A,D] × A → y/n. As before,
‘pfn’ denotes partially-defined functions whose domains are sets.
Exactly as in §5.2, a partially-defined function f : A→ B is R-recursive if:
1. dom[f ] is -saturated; and
2. for every c ∈ C, f [c] = R[f  (c  #), c].
The theorem and proof of §5.2 extend without modification.
To prove universality, suppose (A, λ) is an almost well-founded pairing. De-
fine R : pfn[A,W]×A→W by:
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1. (f, a) ∈ dom[R] if λ[a,#] ⊂ dom[f ], and in this case
2. R[f, a] := (3adj)−1[λ[a,#] ∗ f ].
Note that this definition uses the injectivity of the adjoint 3adj : W → bP[W].
Unwinding definitions gives (R[f, a] 3 x)⇐⇒ (∃b ∈ A | λ[a, b]& f [b] = x).
The maximal R-recursive function f : A→W has domain A, and the recur-
sion condition implies that f is a morphism of pairings (A, λ)→ (W,3).
7.3 Reformulation of the ZFC axioms
A traditional set theory is a pool (class, logical domain) of potential elements,
Σ, and a binary logical operator ‘∈’. We change notation to prefix form and, to
be consistent with previous material, reverse the order: define N : Σ×Σ→ y/n
by N [a, b] := b ∈ a. A set in the theory is a logical function on Σ of the form
# 7→ N [a,#], for some a ∈ Σ. Assume these sets are relaxed sets, by restricting
the theory if necessary. See ‘Quantification in ZFC theories’ below.
Given all this, we translate the ZFC axioms described in [Jech] Ch. 1.
Axioms
As above, Σ is a logical domain, N : Σ × Σ → y/n is a logical pairing, and we
suppose a ∈ Σ.
1. (Well-founded, or Regular) every nonempty set N [a,#] contains an N -
minimal element, ie b such that N [b, c]⇒ not[N [a, c]].
2. Each N [a,#] is a relaxed set, (see note 2);
3. (Extentionality) N [a,#] = N [b,#] implies a = b (see note 3);
4. (Union) !∃ (∪a)] ∈ Σ such thatN [∪a,#] = (N∗N)[a,#]. N∗N is the com-
position of pairings, defined by (N ∗N)[a,#] := (∃b | N [a, b]&N [b,#]).
5. (Powerset) !∃P[a] ∈ Σ such that N [P[a], b] = (N [b,#] ⊂ N [a,#]);
6. (Infinity) There is a with N [a,#] infinite;
7. (Choice) There is a partially-defined function ch : Σ → Σ with domain
a ∈ Σ | N [a,#] 6= Σ satisfying N [a, ch[a]] = no (see note 4);
8. (Separation) If P is an appropriate logical function on Σ (a “property”)
then there is a&P ∈ Σ such that N [a&P,#] = N [a,#]&P [#] (see note
5);
9. (Replacement) Suppose f : Σ → Σ is an appropriate function. Then the
f image of a set is a set (see note 6).
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Notes
1. ‘Well-founded’ is usually put near the end of axiom lists. The universality
theorem indicates that it is a key ingredient, so we put it first.
2. External quantification requires that there be a logical function, defined
on all possible functions A → y/n, that detects the empty function. The
Internal quantification of ZFC requires only that ∅ be detectable among
functions of the form N [a,#]. In principle there could be many fewer of
these so, again in principle, there might be theories with sets that support
internal quantification but not external. If so we discard such sets.
3. The domain Σ may not support quantification, so we may not be able
to identify functions N [a,#] among all possible logical functions on Σ,
but we can identify them within functions of the form N [x,#] as follows.
N [a,#] = N [b,#] means: (∀x ∈ N [a,#])(N [b, x] = yes), and similarly
(∀x ∈ N [b,#])(N [a, x] = yes).
4. In this formulation the choice function provides an element not in the
given set, rather than (as more usual) one in the set. Note that if Σ does
not support quantification then “N [a,#] 6= Σ” does not make good sense.
In this case omit this condition: it is redundant anyway because N [a,#]
is assumed to be a set, so cannot be all of Σ. This is the form used to
show Σ has a well-order, which implies any other form one might want.
5. The point in “Separation” is that a&P is a set, even if P is not (ie. is not
of the form N [p,#]).
6. The intent of “Replacement” is that functions should take sets to sets.
However, the usual definition of “function” uses set theory, so using it here
would make the definition logically circular. The developers of set theory
eventually fell back on an earlier view of functions as “given by formulas”;
see the historical notes in [Jech]. Thus, in standard ZFC, “appropriate”
in Separation and Replacement means “given by an expression in the
first-order logic of sets”. In the theory here, functions (in the guise of
morphisms of descriptors) are primitive objects, and need not be defined.
Roughly speaking, the theory here is universal because “appropriate” is a
subset of “all”.
Verifying the axioms
We verify that (W,3) satisfies the translated axioms.
1. ‘Well-founded’ follows from the fact that the pairing reduces rank, and
rank takes values in a well-ordered domain.
2. The domains 3 [a,#] are relaxed sets because they are bounded subdo-
mains of W.
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3. ‘Extension’ is equivalent to injectivity of the adjoint of 3, and this is a
design requirement in the construction.
4. ‘Infinity’ is a primitive axiom in the system used here.
5. Similarly, ‘Choice’ is a primitive axiom.
6. For Separation, note that 3 [a,#] is bounded, so 3 [a,#]&P is bounded.
7. We interpret ‘Replacement’ in a strong way, namely that any function
W → W should take bounded logical functions to bounded logical func-
tions. This is included in §5.5.
This completes the ZFC axioms, and the proof of the universality theorem.
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